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Abstract 
Previous findings on the subject of Class Biased Economic Voting (CBEV) suggests that voters 
who are not among the wealthiest elite respond positively, in terms of probability of voting for 
the incumbent party or president, to income growth among the wealthiest 5% of households, 
and more so than to mean income growth. The aim of this paper is to explore if this type of 
bias voting is due to voters paying attention to macroeconomic variables that are correlated 
with economic fortunes of the wealthiest elites. It sets out to answer two questions: 1. Does 
stock index performance during election year effect CBEV? 2. Does stock index performance 
increase the probability of voting for the incumbent party or president? The study employs an 
individual level cross-sectional probit model using two measurements of income-growth 
alongside figures of stock index performance. Results indicate that stock index has an impact 
on probability of voting for the incumbent party/ president in France and Sweden but not in the 
United Kingdom (U.K.) Whether or not the stock index causes CBEV is difficult to infer, 
mainly due to the U.K’s responses to the stock market are statistically insignificant, as well 
insignificant results from the French electorate to income-growth. 
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1. Introduction 
Do democratic elections contribute to more equal economic outcomes? This question was 
asked by Hicks et. al. (2016) when they sought to see if voters were prepared to defend their 
own distributional interest when voting for which party or candidate should rule over the 
coming years. Even though people have unequal abilities to influence the market place, they 
are equal in the sense that everyone in a democracy can cast the same number of votes for 
whomever they believe should govern. One could therefore assume that voters ought to elect 
governments that contribute to more equal economic outcomes. However, reports from the 
World Top Income Database (WTID) tell a different story. 
 
Figure 1. Income share of wealthiest 1 % between years 1975 – 2015 (income share shown in decimals) 
(Source; WTID, 2017) 
What we can see from the above figure is that from 1975 until 2015, the national income share 
of the wealthiest one percent in the United States, France, Germany, China, South Africa and 
the United Kingdom, has steadily increased at the expense of the remaining 99 percent. This 
means that voters in these countries have done the opposite of what we might expect, namely 
elected governments that have done a poor job of evening income shares. The trend is not 
unique for these countries, and has been observed in most advanced democracies over the past 
three decades (Hicks et.al. 2016). Also, as pointed out by Piketty and Saez (2013), most of the 
rise in inequality is a result of increasing income shares at the very top of the distribution. This 
leads to the problem of interest for this study: whose income growth is it that matters the most 
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for voters? Bartels (2008) asked the same questions when looking at elections in the U.S, and 
contrary to what one might expect, U.S. voters seem to respond strongly and positively to 
income growth at the top of the income distribution (more so than to mean income growth). 
This is an interesting paradox, which Bartels calls Class Biased Economic Voting1, and one 
that has not been predicted by previous literature.  
The literature on economic voting is large and has been subject of study for many researchers. 
From early stages one of the most robust relationships that was (consistently) found was the 
positive correlation between an area’s economic performance and the performance of the 
incumbent party or president2 (see for example Kramer 1971; Kinder and Kiewiet 1981). 
Although these findings were theoretically sound, Bartels’ findings showed proof of the exact 
opposite, and thus inspired researchers to look at the micro foundations of how individuals 
potentially interpret the state of the economy. In more recent years, focus has been to see how 
and if rising income inequalities effects vote choice where the theoretical emphasis is put 
towards how different groups might perceive aggregate economic indicators3. Acknowledging 
Bartels’ findings, Hopkins (2012) aggregates the U.S economy among low, middle and high-
income earners to see if these groups differ in their assessment of the economy. Even though 
the wealthiest Americans have seen a much faster income growth than the rest, all groups have 
similar views of the national state of the economy and their assessments have varied around 
the same mean for decades4. Hopkin’s results further show that low income earners did not 
seem to care about the fact that income gains have been centred at the very top. In light of these 
findings it may seem tempting to explain Bartels’ finding by the fact that American voters seem 
indifferent towards income growth unproportionately favouring the wealthiest elite. It is not 
that simple however.  
Firstly, Hopkins analysis measures people’s assessments of the state of the economy, not vote 
choice, to which he at the end of his article states that these need not be correlated. Secondly, 
depending on how we aggregate the population, i.e. divide them not only by income but also 
by employment status or location, we may find different results. This is shown by Ansolabehere 
et.al. (2014) who hypothesize that people are influenced by so called mecro5-economies. These 
                                                 
1 Throughout the paper I will refer to Class Biased Economic Voting as CBEV. 
2 Put simply this means that people tend to approve of the incumbent party or president when the economy is in a 
good state.  
3 This stems from theory of sociotropic perception/ voting and will be covered further down.  
4 Contrary to Bartels findings that income measure seemed to matter most for individuals’ assessment of the 
national economy, income growth at the 20:th percentile, not the 95:th  
5 Mecro is a combination between micro and macro economy. 
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are members of groups (consisting of gender, age, location etc.) that are expected to be similarly 
affected by economic shocks and, as voters, they are expected to tick their ballots 
homogenously. Their analysis shows that people who are members of groups who are more 
likely to be unemployed report higher levels of national unemployment rates than people who 
are not. Also, people from states with a higher unemployment rate show worse retrospective 
evaluation of the economy on the aggregate. The point they make is that any model on 
economic voting that does not account for individuals’ mecro-economic conditions is 
necessarily incomplete.   
As earlier introduced, Bartels (2008) discovered Class Biased Economic Voting (CBEV) while 
observing voters in the U.S. His findings suggest that voters who are not at the top of the 
income distribution respond positively and strongly to income growth at the very top of the 
distribution, a finding that departs in every way from earlier studies on economic voting. While 
Bartels’ research only covers U.S. elections, Hicks et.al. (2016) analyse other major economies 
in cohesion with Bartels’ method, and find that CBEV occurs in many European economies as 
well. At the end of their paper, Hicks et.al state that an important avenue for further research 
is to identify mechanisms that give rise to CBEV. They specifically note that fundamental 
limits to voter cognition might make oversimplified views of the economy appealing, but at 
the same time offer no knowledge of distributional effects.  
Departing from Hicks et al, the aim of this paper is to explore if CBEV is due to voters paying 
attention to macroeconomic variables which are correlated with economic fortunes of the 
wealthiest elites. The macroeconomic variable I have chosen is stock indexes since it is a 
frequently reported macroeconomic variable whose benefits are most likely to favour the 
wealthiest. The paper builds upon previous literature on CBEV by Hicks et.al. (2016), and also 
utilizes theory of Ansolabehere et.al. (2014) of mecro economies (people of different income 
and education). It sets out to answer two questions: 1. Does stock index performance during 
election year effect CBEV? 2. Does stock index performance increase the probability of voting 
for the incumbent party or president?  
To answer these questions, I employ an individual level cross-sectional probit model where I 
include measures of household mean income growth as well as income growth of the wealthiest 
5 % and 10 %. Doing so will tell us which variable of economic growth matters for different 
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types of voters6. I will then include figures of countries’ stock indexes to see if it has any effect 
on CBEV. The countries analysed are France, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The model I 
have chosen is inspired from the works of Hicks et. al. (2016) since their purpose was to look 
at CBEV outside of the U.S. 
Results indicate that stock index has an impact on probability of voting for the incumbent party/ 
president in France and Sweden but not in the U.K. This holds true even after we aggregate 
individuals after education level rather than income. When the stock index is added to the 
model, Sweden and the U.K show evidence for the whole electorate and among middle and 
high-income voters of indifference to economic gains going to the wealthiest (inequality). 
France shows weak evidence of demand for this sort of inequality. Signs of stock indexes acting 
as a potential source of CBEV are hinted, but it is difficult to state causality. The main reason 
for this is that the U.K’s responses to the stock market are statistically insignificant, as well 
insignificant results from the French electorate to income-growth.  
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 reviews previous literature and 
theories on economic voting, and gives a closer look at the works of Hicks et.al. (2016) where 
we go into how CBEV is defined. We will also consider variables that determine stock market 
participation. Section 3 describes the countries to be analysed while section 4 outlines the 
method of how they are to be analysed. Section 5 describes the data and variable predictions. 
Section 6 presents the results and section 7 concludes the paper.  
2. Literature review and Theory 
Earlier studies of economic impacts on vote choice, as explained by Conover et.al. (1986), 
assumed the general population to be “pocket-book” voters, meaning that the party or candidate 
people voted for was the one that best reflected their economic interests. Researchers, however, 
struggled to find empirical evidence of this theory on the aggregate level, and instead started 
pointing to the fact that economic conditions impact on voting choice might better be explained 
by sociotropic voting (Kinder and Kiewiet 1979, 1981). Sociotropic voting sought to explain 
voting choice as a result of individuals voting after the state of the national economy which, 
contrary to pocket – book voting, can be argued to have a less egocentric motivation. This 
theory later found good support by the work of Lau and Sears (1981), among others, who 
                                                 
6 Before the findings of Bartels (2008) theory would suggest that low and middle-income voters have a greater 
possibility of voting for the incumbent president or party when they see growth in mean income, and the opposite 
if income disproportionately benefits the wealthiest. But, as has been told, this is not the case. 
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showed that voters’ political evaluations (their belief of how well the economy is doing) is 
based on simple retrospective judgements of the national economy.  
As the research in retrospective voting gained popularity, Conover et.al. argued in their paper 
that even though researchers made good efforts in showing that vote choice indeed was 
influenced by retrospective judgements, more attention had to be given to sources of variation 
in perception of the economy. The reason for this was twofold: firstly, people’s understanding 
of and ability to assess the (state of the) economy varies greatly. This will influence their 
retrospective judgment in different ways. Secondly, there may be serious biases in how 
information is used depending on peoples’ background and knowledge. Using panel data, 
Conover et.al. analysed the above concerns on peoples’ retrospective evaluation on two 
economic factors, inflation and unemployment. Their findings suggest, firstly, that 
retrospective evaluation was influenced by personal economic circumstances and knowledge 
about national economic conditions. Secondly, that people react more quickly to knowledge of 
unemployment than of inflation. 
Previous research shows us that people evaluate the economy retrospectively and that the 
information used varies between individuals depending on their background. But if the 
sociotropic theory holds, then why do we see rising income inequalities when, in theory, most 
people who are not at the top of the income distribution should vote for politicians who 
countervail this trend?  
Research on a possible relationship between vote choice and stock market is scarce but not 
absent. Fauvelle – Aymar et.al. (2013) investigate the relationship between U.S presidential 
approval ratings and the performance of stock market index. They make a couple arguments 
for why the stock market should influence presidential approval ratings. Among these is the 
fact that market figures are one of the most frequently reported macroeconomic indicators and 
often interpreted by media as signs of the nation’s economic health7. Their analysis cover 
elections from 1960 – 2011 and shows that presidential approval ratings are positively 
correlated with accelerations and decelerations of the stock market index. Even though their 
results are only for the American economy, since Hicks et.al showed that Bartels’ findings 
were present in European economies, the findings of Fauvelle – Aymar might very well be 
found in approval ratings of European leaders. Further, stock ownership and stock-market 
                                                 
7 It should be noted that the authors are referring to the American media, not international. Given the influence 
the U.S financial market has on the rest of the world, most modern economies follow this standard.    
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movement shapes policies as well as voting behaviour. This was shown by Nadeau et.al. (2010) 
who introduced the concept of “patrimonial economic voting”. The authors point out that 
people who are holders of high risk assets, such as stocks, place them at a point in society 
where they favour political parties to the right of the political spectrum. Seeing as stock 
ownership has increased over past years, this view should prevail for more and more voters.    
Put together, previous research suggests that voters should retrospectively interpret the stock-
market when deciding what party to vote for. Although it is true that a well preforming market 
will deliver greater returns for the people who hold stock, the market will disproportionally 
increase the income share among the very wealthiest (those who hold the largest assets) 
(Poterba, 2000). Add to this the trends shown by Nadeau et.al. where policies to the right are 
increasingly favoured among the electorate which, contrary to more left sided policies, do not 
prioritize redistribution. A model on economic voting that analyses the stock-market could 
therefore possibly shed light on the global trend of class biased economic voting.   
In the next section I will explain more in depth the method and results of Hicks et.al. (2016) as 
it is their method that has been the main inspiration in my own analysis.  
2.1 Returning to Hicks et.al. (2016) 
This paper adopts the method used by Hicks et.al. (2016) which in turn was inspired by Bartels 
(2008). Since my analysis focuses on European countries I have chosen to take inspiration from 
Hicks et.al. as their goal was to find evidence of CBEV outside of the U.S. Hicks et.al.’s 
definition of CBEV is the electorate’s response to the distribution of income gains between 
high-income households compared to low and middle-income. The question Hicks and co-
authors examine is: for a given amount of aggregate growth, how do low and middle-income 
respond to differing allocations of income between the rich and the rest? Their data on income 
is drawn from tax records of each country and has been ordered into percentiles. The two main 
income variables are thus mean income (for the whole population measured as household 
disposable income) and mean income growth of the top 5% households8. Households are then 
aggregated into approximate terciles to distinguish low, middle and high-income households.    
Hicks et.al.’s analysis is divided into two parts and the one relevant for this paper is centred 
around a micro level cross-sectional probit model. To see if CBEV is present in their model, 
                                                 
8 The richness of their data has allowed the authors to create different measures of income outside of mean income 
and top 5%. For controls they created, among others, bottom 40%, 20:th percentile, 50:th percentile and so on. 
Mean income and top 5% are however their two main variables and consequentially the ones I have included in 
my analysis.   
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they look at the coefficients of the growth variables. Their dependent variable is a dummy 
which is coded 1 if the individual has voted for the incumbent and 0 if they have not. A positive 
sign on the coefficient of growth at the top 5% indicates what they call demand for inequality 
since this suggests that growth for the richest 5% (at the expense of the remaining 95%) 
increases the likelihood of voting for the incumbent. This is true if the individual is not among 
the top 5% of the income distribution. If the opposite shows, that is if the variable for top 5% 
income growth shows a negative sign, it can be interpreted as inequality aversion. Similarly, a 
negative coefficient for mean income growth indicates demand for inequality as this would 
show that income growth that serves to even the income distribution does not increase the 
likelihood of that individual voting for the incumbent. The opposite is true if the coefficient is 
negative. In cases where the authors observe that both coefficients are either positive or 
negative their interpretation is that of indifference to inequality. 
Their results are summarized in table 1 and are reported as shown in their paper.  
Table 1. Summary of responses to rising income inequality across four countries (Results presented as 
in Hicks et.al (2016) table 7). 
Countries All Voters Low Income Middle income 
United States Demand Demand Demand 
Sweden Demand Demand Demand/indifference 
United Kingdom Demand Demand/indifference Demand 
Canada Indifference Indifference Indifference 
 
As told in section 1, all countries analysed (apart from Canada) display patterns of CBEV 
which is shown from the demand of inequality from Low and middle-income households. 
Canada´s electorate may only display indifference to inequality, but it is still safe to conclude 
that none of the countries observed have punished governments for rising income gains among 
the wealthiest. This is because all four countries under the years 1952 – 2004 have had 
governments who have disproportionally delivered income gains for the wealthiest 5% as well 
as gains to the lower 95%. This means that both income groups have seen periods when income 
growth has worked to their advantage, on the aggregate, both low and middle-income voters 
are still more likely to vote for the incumbent party or president in elections years when income 
growth disproportionately favours the wealthiest.   
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Adopting the method by Hicks et.al, I am going to add data on countries’ largest stock index 
to see if any further conclusion can be drawn on CBEV. The basis for doing this is to explore 
the possibility Hicks et.al. put forth at the end of their paper that voters may consider easy to 
interpret macroeconomic indicators (a stock index) to gain information of the state of the 
economy, that at the same time are more likely to increase the income of the wealthiest rather 
than mean income. Before I do so it is necessary to go through some theoretical basis 
concerning what group of people are more or less likely to participate in the stock market. To 
put it differently, in the absence of information on stock holding, what variables can we include 
in a model that likely captures individuals who hold stock?  
2.2 What Determines Stock Market Participation?  
Since the 1990s, the overall trend for European countries has been that of an increase in stock 
market participation. For this reason, when analysing if stock-market has any effect on CBEV, 
we should consider what type of people are more likely to participate in the stock-market and 
consequentially are more likely to hold stock. By controlling for variables that capture these 
people we can get a cleaner estimate of the stock-index’s effect on CBEV.   
Guiso et. al. (2003) set out to cover the current state (as of 2003) of household stockownership 
in major European countries9. Across all countries they find that income, education and 
financial wealth are variables that increase the probability of stock market participation. The 
positive effect from wealth and income has a straight forward interpretation according to the 
authors in terms of participation cost. The participation cost will be lower for individuals with 
greater wealth and labour income as they are more likely to have “cash on hand”, as the authors 
put it, making any cost of entering the market less of an obstacle. This effect also tends to have 
self-enforcing mechanisms as larger investors are often offered better terms from the financial 
service sector than smaller ones. The authors also point to the possibility of peer effects, as 
more affluent households are most likely to have peers in the stock market, which may create 
further incentives among households who have not invested in stocks. The existence of peer 
effects on investment decision has been documented by Duflo et.al. (2002) who show that 
individuals who choose to enrol in a retirement plan are affected by peers in the same 
department.      
Education on the other hand increases the likelihood of participating in the stock market by 
reducing the perceived entry cost i.e. information barriers. As the authors point out, investing 
                                                 
9 These are France, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, U.K.  
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through a fund either directly or indirectly involves substantial amounts of delegation as well 
as monitoring by the investor. Since their analysis showed that more highly educated 
individuals have a greater probability of participating in the stock market, it points towards the 
fact that this type of information is more at hand, or to put it differently, more educated 
individuals face lower information barriers. This theory is to some extent corroborated by 
Beyer et. al. (2009) who looks at how education influences financial decision-making skills. 
Specifically, they study people who during the 1990s were exposed to programmes of financial 
education by their employers. They find that both participation in and contribution to voluntary 
saving plans are much higher for individuals whose employer offered financial education10.  
The last variable we are going to account for as a predictor of stock market participation is 
where people stand in the political spectrum. People who are on the right side of the political 
spectrum are also more likely to be participants in the stock market. The theoretical basis for 
this was covered in section 2 where I refer to the work of Nadeau et.al. who states that people 
who hold high risk assets, such as stocks, are at a point in society where they favour political 
parties to the right of the political spectrum. 
 So how are controlling for these variables going to help us understand CBEV since they are 
predictor only for participation in the stock market? The first reason is to compensate for the 
fact that this study does not utilize data on individual’s stock holdings as it is not easy to come 
by. I instead control for the variables described above to determine individuals who are likely 
to hold stock. This is by no means as good a method as it would be to include data on actual 
stock holding. However, if we include information of these variables and find that, for example, 
low-income voters or voters without a college education respond positively, in terms of voting 
for the incumbent, when a stock index is preforming well, this could be interpreted as a sign of 
CBEV as this individual has less to gain from a well preforming stock-index than would a high- 
income or college educated voter.       
3. Describing the sample; France, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
What can we expect?  
In this chapter I am going to present statistics of the countries to be analysed in terms of 
variables covered in previous section. The information relates to variables analysed in the 
model (income, education and left-right scale) and are meant to provide an overview of how 
                                                 
10 This effect was found to be greater for non-highly compensated workers than highly compensated.  
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these are represented in each country. I will also, briefly, relate them to the theory as predictors 
of stock market participation and CBEV.   
Firstly, are we likely to find evidence of CBEV in France, Sweden and the U.K? For Sweden 
and the U.K, that answer should be yes given that Hicks et.al. already gave proof for this in 
their study. France should be no exception and as we can see in figure 1, the income share of 
the wealthiest 1% since 1975 has been increasing (even though the wealthy elite in France has 
the smallest share of the six countries). Including France in our analysis will then tell us how 
the electorate has responded to this uneven income growth.  
What about each countries stock market participation? We shall look at this for the three 
countries after the variables Income, education and left-right scale.  
 
 
Figure 2. Stock market participation by income decile. (Figure as shown by Guise et.al. 2003 for France, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom) Y-axis shows Participation share, X-axis shows income decile.  
Income 
Starting with income, from the figure above we can see the positive effect income has on 
probability of stock market participation. The theory behind this relationship was covered in 
section 2.2 and as we can see it seems to hold true for the three countries. Next, we shall look 
at actual self-reported income. The data is collected from a survey held by the European Social 
Survey (ESS)11. As we can see from the figures (displayed in appendix 1.) the income is more 
evenly spread amongst France and the U.K. as the density is more even over the deciles. 
Sweden, on the other hand, has most respondents with self-reported income within the 9:th 
decile and fever within the 1:st to 3:rd decile. What this tells us then, is that we can expect to 
                                                 
11I will cover the data used in section 4. For now, it should be noted that I have chosen to display figures on income 
(as well as education and left-right scale) from the actual samples that I have analysed and that this data I collected 
from the ESS. 
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have groups of people in all countries who are likely to be participants in the stock market, and 
that Sweden has the largest (relative) group of potential stock market participants.  
Education 
Moving on to education (see appendix 1.2). The three countries show some variation in terms 
of most represented education level with “Less Than Primary” being the most common level 
for respondents in the U.K, “Primary” in Sweden and “Undergrad” for France. Relating to the 
theory in section 2.2, higher education increases the likelihood of stock market participation. 
Looking at what country has the largest group of respondents with an education level above 
primary, France should have the most respondents who are more likely to participate in the 
stock market (with Undergraduate and Master adding up to 53.11% of the sample compared to 
27.59% for Sweden and 31.5% for the U.K). It should be noted that the survey does not specify 
what type of degree the respondent has, only at what level they have obtained their degree. It 
is reasonable to assume that an undergraduate in finance is more likely to hold stock than an 
undergraduate in, say, medicine. That said, a person with an academic degree could have an 
easier time gathering the information necessary to participate in the stock market (regardless 
of subject/ major in the degree) which would lower the information barrier explained by Guiso 
et. al. (2003) and thus increase the likelihood of partaking in the stock market. 
Left-right scale 
Finally, we move on to left-right scale (appendix 1.3). Similar for all countries is that most 
respondents report to be in the middle of the left right spectrum. As theory predicts, people 
further to the right of the political spectrum are more likely to hold stock. The U.K. has the 
largest share of voters in the middle of the spectrum (over 40%). Sweden is the country with 
the largest share of voters above 5 on the political spectrum with 42.01% compared to 32.66% 
for France and 29.96 for the U.K. 
4. Method 
In this chapter I am going to specify the model used to analyse if stock-market index can help 
explain Class Biased Economic Voting.  
The model is an individual level cross sectional probit model with a dependent variable 
Vote_Inc coded 1 if the respondent has voted for the sitting president or party, 0 otherwise. For 
France and the U.K the coding is simple as the former is after the sitting president and the latter 
since there are only two major parties (Labour or Conservatives). For Sweden whose 
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government usually governs as a coalition, I have coded votes for the largest party within the 
coalition as 1 (during the timespan analysed this has been either Socialdemokraterna or 
Moderaterna). The core specification of the model is as follows; 
𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖,𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑦,𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∙ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑦,𝑡
𝑀 + 𝛽4 ∙ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑦,𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑝5 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
where the primary variables to determine CBEV is GrowthTop5y,t and Growth
M
y,t each measuring 
income growth of the wealthiest 5% as well as mean income growth during election year 
respectively. Sub-indexes i,y,t stand for individual, country and year respectively. The theory 
on how CBEV is defined and measured has been covered in section 2.1 and is the same method 
that I will use. As Hicks et.al. were able to construct the variables GrowthTop5y,t and Growth
M
y,t 
from tax records of each individual, I have had to rely on external data sources to create the 
variables. These will be covered in the section below. Initially I will run the same specification 
as Hicks et.al. (which I name my primary specification) thus, only testing for CBEV in each of 
the three countries. This will be done by first running the regression for the whole sample and 
then by income terciles to see how low, middle and high-income voters respond to the two 
measures of income growth. It will differ from Hicks et.al. in two ways. Firstly, as Hicks et.al 
only aggregate between low and middle income I will be aggregating for high income voters 
as well. I do this since once we add the stock-index to the model it should be of interest to look 
at how high-income voters respond to the index given that they are more likely to participate/ 
hold stock. Also, the income data I have for respondents is self-reported after income placement 
in decile with the upper bound (10:th decile) being defined in the survey as any income equal 
to or greater than £5000012. Given the upper limit in the survey is set at £50000 there are 
potential respondents who self-report into the highest decile but are not among top 5% of 
income earners. In the U.K according to the Office of National Statistics (ONS, 2017) 
households in the highest decile have over £107000 annual disposable income. For this reason, 
it makes sense to see how people in the top decile responds to GrowthTop5y,t in the sample.  
In this primary specification, I am going to use two controls in accordance with previous 
research. Firstly, I will control for Tenure of incumbent (logTenure) which is the number of 
years they have held office. I use log of years of tenure rather than years of tenure since, like 
Hicks et.al. suggests, there is likely to be a diminishing cost of governing the longer a party or 
president is in power. Secondly, I will control for whether or not the respondent identifies with 
incumbent of party (prtclose). According to both Hicks et.al. and Bartels (2008), this variable 
                                                 
12Each country has its own currency listed in the survey but the amount is equal to £50000.  
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is a strong predictor for vote choice and will provide a cleaner estimate on election year income 
changes.    
Having done the primary specification, I will move on to add figures of election year stock 
index performance for each country13 for the whole sample as well as aggregating for low, 
middle and high-income earners (plus controls specified earlier). I will also control for where 
voters stand in the political left-right spectrum (variable named lrscale). Using the same 
method of identifying CBEV, we are going to look at the coefficients of GrowthTop5t and 
GrowthMt to find any potential changes after adding the stock-index. For the last part of the 
analysis I am going to add the variables of education. Here I will aggregate, in that same manner 
as for income, after voter with less than a primary education, primary, undergraduate and 
master education to see how different groups vote choice is affected by movements of the stock 
market.  
5. Data and Variable Predictions 
In this chapter I will be covering the data used, how the variables are constructed as well as 
their interpretations and how they, in the theory, should affect vote choice.  
Data on voting, income, education, placement on political left-right scale and party 
identification are collected from the European Social Survey (ESS) and span between the years 
2002 – 2014. The ESS is an academically driven cross national survey that takes places every 
second year across multiple countries in Europe utilizing face to face interviews with the main 
goal of measuring behavioural patterns, believes and attitudes for a diverse population. Finding 
sources with detailed individual level data is somewhat difficult and for a paper such as this 
one, where the method builds upon previous research on CBEV, the ESS is a good data source 
since all key variables are gathered in one database. All individuals in the survey are selected 
by strict random probability methods, and the only requirement is that the individual is at least 
15 years old and a resident within a private household in each country regardless of citizenship, 
language or nationality.  
Data on voting is the dependent variable for every specification of the model and has been 
coded as described in section 3. Since the data spans from the years 2002 – 2014, the number 
of elections held in each country differs. For France there has been a total of three elections, 
four in Sweden and two in the U.K. For each country the name of the variable is voteinc. Data 
                                                 
13 For France I will use CAC40, Sweden OMXS30 and the U.K FTSE-100. 
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on income is self-reported for each individual household total net income (from all sources) 
and represents their placement in the income decile. As is the case for all self-reported data 
there may be some bias as individuals may over or underestimate their income. However, since 
data on income is only used to aggregate households into low, middle and high income the 
potential bias will not have an effect on the estimation as it is not included as an independent 
variable. 
Data on placement on the political spectrum is the variable named lrscale and is ordered from 
0 (left) to 10 (right). As was covered in the theory section people more to the right on the 
political spectrum are assumed to be more likely to hold stock. The predictive outcome this 
variable will have on vote choice will depend on what individual you look at. For an individual 
on the left its coefficient may be negative if the incumbent party or president is considered 
right-wing, and opposite for a left-wing party or president. Including lrscale in the regression 
however, will hopefully serve to give a cleaner estimate of the stock-index´s impact on 
individual vote choice as people to the right are more likely to hold stock.  
Data on mean household disposable income (variable named hhdinc in regressions) are 
gathered from the Organization of Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) and are 
collected as growth rates corresponding to each countries’ election years. The measure is 
defined by the OECD as the sum of household final consumption expenditures and savings, 
minus the change in net equity of households in pension funds. Data on top income growth 
(that is the wealthiest 5 and 10% of households) has been collected from the World Top Income 
Database (WTID). This is measured as pre-tax national income and had to be converted into 
growth rates of which I have, again, used the growth rate during election years. The variables 
are named GrowthT5 and GrowthT10 for top 5 and 10% respectively. As income growth among 
the top 5% was unavailable for Sweden at WTID I had to rely on income growth at the top 
10% which I have gathered from Statistics Sweden (SCB), a government agency that produces 
official statistics for Sweden. As previous research has shown the coefficient of GrowthT5 has 
been shown to have a positive impact on probability of voting for the incumbent and is expected 
to have the same effect here for France and the U.K. As Sweden has a different growth 
measurement for top income (GrowthT10) it is not with certainty that we observe the same 
relationship as for GrowthT5. However, the prediction is still that GrowthT10 will have a 
positive impact on probability if voting for the incumbent. It should be noted that if we observe 
a positive coefficient of either GrowthT5 or GrowthT10 this does not have to be a sign of CBEV 
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if the person has high enough income as the income growth is in fact that which represents his 
own. For low and middle-income voters, it is a sign of CBEV.  
Data on countries stock-indexes has been collected from Macrotrends a database containing 
long term figures in market indexes and are collected as days end closing values. These values 
have been constructed into growth rates to show yearly performance during election years. 
Coefficients of the stock market are expected to have a positive impact on voting for the 
incumbent.  
For education each country lists over 20 different types of education. Respondents are coded 
after what corresponds to a primary level (high school degree) named (Primary in regression), 
undergraduate degree (Undergraduate), and a masters degree (Master). People without any of 
the three degrees are coded as No Primary.  
6. Results 
I will begin my analysis by replicating the method of Hicks et.al. (2016) to look for the presence 
of CBEV. After that I will add figures of each countries stock-index as well as left-right scale 
to see what effect it has on probability of voting for the incumbent. We then follow up by 
adding information of individuals’ education. This section focuses mainly on presenting 
results, conclusions will be considered in section 7. 
6.1 Hicks et.al. Model for CBEV (Primary Specification) 
We begin with looking at probit estimates for France (Table 2). Model 1 estimates the full 
sample including all income deciles with the two income measures hhdinc for mean household 
disposable income and GrowthT5 as income for the wealthiest 5% of households. The negative 
sign in front of hhdinc as well as the positive for GrowthT5 indicates the presence of CBEV 
for the whole electorate. In model 2, using the same definitions as Hicks et.al, we can see that 
low-income voters display indifference to both mean and top income growth due to that fact 
that both coefficients are insignificant (but with the expected signs). Following along model 3 
and four we can see that both middle and high-income voters show a tendency for CBEV 
which, again, can be seen from the negative sign in front of hhdinc and the positive sign of 
GrowthT5. Put together, aside from the estimations in model two France displays clear 
evidence of CBEV amongst the electorate.  
The estimates for Sweden are found in table 3. The results for Sweden are not as clear cut as 
those for France. Starting off with the coefficients for GrowthT10 which are negative across 
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all models. This is in accordance with earlier theories of economic voting and shows that the 
Swedish electorate is prepared to punish income growth that disproportionately benefits the 
wealthiest 10%14. These results are strengthened amongst low and middle-income voters 
(model 2 and 3 respectively) as the coefficients for hhdinc are positive and significant.      
Table 2. Probit estimates for France on Predictors of Voting for the Incumbent President. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES voteinc voteinc voteinc voteinc 
     
logtenure -0.00525 0.0609 0.00486 -0.0245 
 (0.0370) (0.0816) (0.0759) (0.0518) 
prtclose 1.636*** 1.365*** 1.468*** 1.801*** 
 (0.0460) (0.110) (0.0879) (0.0627) 
hhdinc -0.0941*** -0.0712 -0.0869** -0.113*** 
 (0.0225) (0.0836) (0.0401) (0.0306) 
GrowthT5 0.0525*** 0.0391 0.0471*** 0.0595*** 
 (0.00854) (0.0267) (0.0153) (0.0122) 
Constant -0.805*** -0.912*** -0.813*** -0.768*** 
 (0.0945) (0.227) (0.183) (0.131) 
Pseudo R2 0.2380 0.1565 0.1891 0.2941 
Deciles  All  Low  Middle High 
     
Observations 4,900 890 1,371 2,639 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Model 1 and 4 both have negative coefficients on hhdinc but is only significant in model 4. 
Following Hicks et.al, in model 1, this should be interpreted as inequality aversion since the 
coefficient for GrowthT10 is significant and negative. For model 4, the coefficients have 
somewhat contradictive interpretations as the negative (significant) coefficient of hhdinc show 
a demand for inequality whilst that of GrowthT10 indicates the opposite. Put together, 
regressing income growth amongst wealthiest 10% rather than 5%, the Swedish electorate 
displays inequality aversion. 
Lastly, we shall look at regression results for the U.K in table 4. Evidence of CBEV can only 
be found among low-income voters where, between the two variables for income growth, only 
GrowthT5 is positive and significant. In the remaining models the British electorate shows 
                                                 
14 This might be somewhat surprising amongst high income voters given that some are within the 9:th decile. As 
a test I ran the regression separately for voters within the 9:th and the coefficient for GrowthT10 remained 
significant and negative.     
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indifference to inequality as coefficients for both mean and top income growth are significant 
and positive.  
Table 3. Probit estimates for Sweden on Predictors of Voting for the Incumbent Party. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES voteinc voteinc voteinc voteinc 
     
logtenure 0.229*** 0.0284 0.411*** 0.174*** 
 (0.0387) (0.148) (0.0790) (0.0476) 
prtclose 2.416*** 2.424*** 2.363*** 2.422*** 
 (0.0439) (0.158) (0.0837) (0.0550) 
hhdinc -0.00406 0.195** 0.0762* -0.108*** 
 (0.0222) (0.0944) (0.0434) (0.0288) 
GrowthT10 -0.0349*** -0.0564** -0.0376*** -0.0308*** 
 (0.00347) (0.0250) (0.00610) (0.00435) 
Constant -1.142*** -1.308*** -1.643*** -0.770*** 
 (0.0868) (0.334) (0.169) (0.111) 
Pseudo R2 0.4138 0.3583 0.4077 0.4224 
Deciles  All Low Middle High 
     
Observations 8,147 818 2,323 5,006 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 4. Probit estimates for the U.K on Predictors of Voting for the Incumbent Party. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES voteinc voteinc voteinc voteinc 
     
logtenure -0.108*** -0.170*** -0.0356 -0.0895** 
 (0.0267) (0.0483) (0.0595) (0.0384) 
prtclose 1.055*** 0.689*** 1.176*** 1.144*** 
 (0.0315) (0.0697) (0.0615) (0.0437) 
hhdinc 0.0535*** 0.0473 0.107*** 0.0521*** 
 (0.0143) (0.0571) (0.0263) (0.0189) 
GrowthT5 0.0148*** 0.0159** 0.0175*** 0.0158*** 
 (0.00277) (0.00679) (0.00567) (0.00381) 
Constant -0.401*** 0.00903 -0.683*** -0.532*** 
 (0.0732) (0.171) (0.158) (0.102) 
Pseudo R2 0.1014 0.0459 0.1427 0.1148 
Deciles All  Low  Middle High 
     
Observations 9,820 1,926 2,596 5,298 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The purpose of this section was to see if CBEV was present in the three countries analysed. So 
far, only the French electorate shows signs of CBEV as income growth among the wealthiest 
5% has a positive impact on probability of voting for the president. Sweden on the other hand, 
where the specified model included income growth among wealthiest 10% (rather than 5%) 
showed evidence leaning more towards inequality aversion. Results for the U.K pointed 
towards indifference to inequality as both income growth among the wealthiest 5% and mean 
income growth had a positive impact on probability of voting for the incumbent government.       
6.2 Adding Stock-Index and lrscale 
In this section we are going to add figures of each country’s stock-market to above models as 
well as lrscale.  
The results for France are shown in table 5. In all four models we can see that performance of 
the stock index (cac40) has a highly significant positive effect on probability of voting for the 
president. As we recall from previous sections, the purpose of adding stock market to the 
regression was to see if any further conclusion could be drawn upon CBEV, to do this we need 
to observe changes to the coefficients of hhdinc and GrowthT5. As we can see the coefficient 
of GrowthT5 is no longer significant in any of the models and has further switched sign for low 
and middle-income voters (model 2 and 3 respectively). The coefficients of hhdinc have the 
same sign as in table 2 but are now significant only for the whole electorate and high-income 
voters (model 1 and 4 respectively). Lrscale is positive and significant in all models. The 
change in signs and the loss of significance in model 2 and 3 for the coefficients of GrowthT5 
may be due to possible multicollinearity between cac40 and GrowthT5.    
  
Page 22 of 39 
 
         
Table 5. Probit estimates for France on Predictors of Voting for the Incumbent President. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES voteinc voteinc voteinc voteinc 
     
logtenure -0.138*** -0.0943 -0.167* -0.116* 
 (0.0446) (0.100) (0.0911) (0.0621) 
prtclose 1.347*** 1.185*** 1.237*** 1.448*** 
 (0.0555) (0.137) (0.106) (0.0747) 
hhdinc -0.0749*** -0.0592 -0.0390 -0.114*** 
 (0.0276) (0.100) (0.0509) (0.0371) 
GrowthT5 0.00374 -0.0159 -0.0218 0.0224 
 (0.0153) (0.0407) (0.0298) (0.0212) 
cac40 2.702*** 2.924*** 3.349*** 2.376*** 
 (0.421) (0.881) (0.799) (0.637) 
lrscale 0.342*** 0.339*** 0.344*** 0.343*** 
 (0.0116) (0.0247) (0.0216) (0.0166) 
Constant -2.661*** -2.824*** -2.734*** -2.571*** 
 (0.130) (0.309) (0.254) (0.180) 
Pseudo R2 0.4494 0.4142 0.4247 0.4772 
Deciles All Low Middle High 
Observations 4,875 883 1,369 2,623 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
Results for Sweden are shown in table 6. The stock index (omxs30) is significant and positive 
in model 1,3 and 4. After adding omxs30 to the model the coefficients of GrowthT10 are still 
negative and significant across all models apart from low income voter (model 2) for which it 
is insignificant. The coefficients of hhdinc have now switched signs in model 3 and stays 
significant whilst the sign remains negative in model 1 (the whole electorate) and is now 
significant. Omxs30 and lrscale are positive and significant across all models apart from mode 
2 and 3, respectively, where they are positive but insignificant. 
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Table 6. Probit estimates for Sweden on Predictors of Voting for the Incumbent Party.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES voteinc voteinc voteinc voteinc 
     
logtenure 0.269*** 0.267 0.470*** 0.199*** 
 (0.0414) (0.226) (0.0836) (0.0506) 
prtclose 2.398*** 2.026*** 2.348*** 2.419*** 
 (0.0442) (0.166) (0.0844) (0.0553) 
hhdinc -0.134*** 0.121 -0.144* -0.216*** 
 (0.0379) (0.123) (0.0766) (0.0493) 
GrowthT10 -0.179*** -0.169 -0.272*** -0.148*** 
 (0.0352) (0.130) (0.0711) (0.0453) 
omxs30 5.616*** 4.978 9.189*** 4.537*** 
 (1.367) (5.231) (2.760) (1.760) 
lrscale 0.0305*** 0.206*** 0.00476 0.0169* 
 (0.00750) (0.0282) (0.0135) (0.00991) 
Constant -0.652*** -2.288*** -0.582 -0.312 
 (0.180) (0.498) (0.365) (0.235) 
Pseudo R2   0.4191 0.4302 0.4119 0.4268 
Deciles  All  Low Middle High 
Observations 8,021 801 2,274 4,946 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Lastly, results for the U.K are presented in table 7. Contrary to both France and Sweden after 
adding the U. K’s largest stock-index (ftse100) it’s coefficients are insignificant across all 
models. Further we can see that the significance in coefficients of GrowthT5 remained positive 
and significant in model 1,3 and four but is now insignificant and with switched sign in model 
2 (low-income voters). Same changes can be observed for Coefficients of mean income growth 
(hhdinc) where only that of model 2 has switched sign and turned insignificant. Lrscale is 
significant across all models but, unlike France and Sweden, it´s coefficients are negative. 
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Table 7. Probit estimates for the U.K. on Predictors of Voting for the Incumbent Party. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES voteinc voteinc voteinc voteinc 
     
logtenure -0.123*** -0.176*** -0.0206 -0.121*** 
 (0.0298) (0.0534) (0.0653) (0.0435) 
prtclose 1.112*** 0.778*** 1.208*** 1.188*** 
 (0.0347) (0.0766) (0.0671) (0.0487) 
hhdinc 0.0758* -0.0443 0.241*** 0.131** 
 (0.0406) (0.123) (0.0817) (0.0574) 
GrowthT5 0.0175*** -0.00321 0.0303*** 0.0263*** 
 (0.00552) (0.0232) (0.0108) (0.00711) 
ftse100 0.552 -5.018 5.099 2.926 
 (1.568) (5.462) (3.136) (2.138) 
lrscale -0.250*** -0.207*** -0.235*** -0.276*** 
 (0.00824) (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0119) 
Constant 0.788*** 1.330*** 0.0137 0.614*** 
 (0.163) (0.423) (0.337) (0.232) 
Pseudo R2 0.1893 0.1166 0.2147 0.2163 
Deciles All Low Middle High 
Observations 9,091 1,753 2,408 4,930 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Because there may be possible multicollinearity between stock-market index and that of 
income growth of the wealthiest 5% I have run a control regression for France and the U.K 
using income growth of top 10% rather than 5%. The reason for doing this is to see we get 
more robust estimates of both income variables (in terms of signs and significance) seeing as 
income growth of top 10% may be less correlated with the stock-index. The results of these 
regressions are presented in appendix 1.4. While no noticeable changes can be observed for the 
U.K, for France the coefficient of GrowthT10 now has a positive sign in model 3 and 4 and is 
now significant in model 4.  
6.3 Adding Education.  
In this section we are adding data on respondents’ education. Similarly, to previous sections, 
for each country and in each model we are going to aggregate the electorate for different 
education levels to see if the stock index has any effect in CBEV.  
Page 25 of 39 
 
We start with France, results of which are found in table 815.   
Table 8. Probit Estimates for France on Predictors of Voting for the Incumbent President.  
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES voteinc voteinc voteinc 
    
logtenure -0.141* -0.188*** 0.100 
 (0.0808) (0.0653) (0.122) 
prtclose 1.612*** 1.067*** 1.234*** 
 (0.0985) (0.0935) (0.144) 
hhdinc -0.0445 -0.116** -0.0386 
 (0.0491) (0.0529) (0.0724) 
GrowthT5 -0.0519* 0.0449 0.00116 
 (0.0279) (0.0367) (0.0379) 
lrscale 0.268*** 0.381*** 0.516*** 
 (0.0195) (0.0186) (0.0374) 
cac40 4.493*** 1.742** 1.354 
 (0.789) (0.870) (1.110) 
Constant -2.490*** -2.585*** -3.887*** 
 (0.239) (0.234) (0.365) 
Pseudo R2 0.4436 0.4175 0.5413 
Education No Primary Undergraduate Master 
Observations 1,460 1,913 880 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The coefficient for left-right scale (lrscale) is positive and significant across all education 
levels. Coefficient of GrowthT5 is significant and negative for individuals with less than a 
primary education and positive but insignificant for those with an undergraduate or maser level 
education. Like in table 6 the stock-index coefficient (cac40) remains positive across all models 
but is only significant for no primary and undergraduate level education. The coefficient for 
mean income growth (hhdinc) remains negative but is only significant in model 2 
(undergraduate education). 
In table 9 we can see the results for Sweden. As was the case for France the coefficient for 
lrscale is positive across all education levels but for Sweden it is only significant for individuals 
with less than primary and undergraduate education (model 1 and 3 respectively). Looking at 
GrowthT10 we can see that it´s coefficients remain negative compared to table 7 for all 
education levels and is only insignificant for master educated individuals. Omxs30 remains 
positive as in table 7 and is in table 10 significant for no primary, primary and undergraduate 
education (model 1,2 and 3 respectively). Coefficients for mean-income growth (hhdinc) are 
                                                 
15 For France respondents with only primary education had to be excluded due to cac40 being omitted.  
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negative and significant for primary, undergraduate and master education (model 2,3 and 4 
respectively).  
Table 9 Probit Estimates for Sweden on Predictors of Voting for the Incumbent Party. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES voteinc voteinc voteinc voteinc 
     
logtenure 0.356*** 0.324*** 0.187 0.0469 
 (0.0800) (0.0629) (0.135) (0.0966) 
prtclose 2.268*** 2.425*** 2.459*** 2.359*** 
 (0.0806) (0.0732) (0.124) (0.103) 
hhdinc 0.00455 -0.158** -0.244*** -0.271*** 
 (0.0668) (0.0683) (0.0888) (0.101) 
GrowthT10 -0.177*** -0.186*** -0.166** -0.135 
 (0.0612) (0.0640) (0.0829) (0.0945) 
lrscale 0.0391*** 0.0103 0.0973*** 0.0158 
 (0.0130) (0.0120) (0.0225) (0.0200) 
omxs30 5.027** 6.015** 5.480* 4.381 
 (2.378) (2.481) (3.226) (3.671) 
Constant -1.044*** -0.541 -0.816** -0.125 
 (0.311) (0.330) (0.399) (0.488) 
Pseudo R2 0.4137 0.4171 0.4657 0.4234 
Education No Primary Primary Undergraduate Master 
Observations 2,423 3,003 1,236 1,335 
Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Lastly, we move on to results for the U.K in table 10. The coefficient of lrscale is significant 
across all models but, contrary to France and Sweden, has a negative sign. Comparing 
GrowthT5 to table 8, after aggregating for education rather that income deciles the coefficients 
still have a positive sign although now it is only significant for undergraduate education (model 
3). Ftse100 has positive coefficients for undergraduate and master (model 3 and 4 respectively) 
and negative for no primary and primary (model 1 and 2 respectively) but remain insignificant 
across all models. Apart from primary education hhdinc´s coefficients have a positive sign in 
all models but are now insignificant.   
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Table 10. Probit Estimates for the U.K on Predictors of Voting for the Incumbent Party.   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES voteinc voteinc voteinc voteinc 
     
logtenure -0.160*** -0.120*** -0.113 0.00558 
 (0.0587) (0.0415) (0.0852) (0.0972) 
prtclose 1.425*** 0.581*** 1.463*** 0.617*** 
 (0.0598) (0.0625) (0.0715) (0.163) 
hhdinc 0.0270 -0.0289 0.0627 0.221 
 (0.0649) (0.116) (0.0678) (0.327) 
GrowthT5 0.0121 0.0219 0.0194** 0.0321 
 (0.00869) (0.0157) (0.00969) (0.0402) 
lrscale -0.221*** -0.261*** -0.250*** -0.358*** 
 (0.0138) (0.0149) (0.0171) (0.0367) 
ftse100 -0.0940 -2.199 0.377 6.547 
 (2.462) (4.636) (2.471) (12.03) 
Constant 0.956*** 1.332*** 0.523 0.527 
 (0.280) (0.418) (0.328) (1.105) 
Pseudo R2 0.2245 0.1319 0.2601 0.1786 
Education No Primary Primary Undergraduate Master 
Observations 3,280 2,799 2,470 529 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
6.4 Analysis of Result 
In this section we will conclude the results and from the above regressions. As the main interest 
is to see how CBEV patterns change after adding the stock-index to the primary specifications, 
I will where ever possible look at changes in common to all countries and then individual 
changes.   
We start of by summarizing the results from table 2 – 4, where we examined if the three 
countries displayed any patterns of CBEV. We can see from the positive coefficient of 
GrowthT5 and negative on hhdinc, that France is the only country that shows clear evidence of 
demand for inequality across the whole electorate as income groups are more likely to vote for 
the incumbent when income growth benefits the wealthiest 5%. The U.K has robust results for 
indifference to inequality as both coefficients of GrowthT5 and hhdinc are positive across all 
income groups. Only mean income growth is insignificant for low-income voters. I interpret 
these results as indifference to inequality since all income groups respond in a positive way (in 
terms of voting for the incumbent) when income growth favours either the wealthiest 5% or 
Page 28 of 39 
 
mean income households. Sweden’s results are not as robust across the four models as for 
France and the U.K. While the coefficients of GrowthT10 are negative across all models, on 
its own this does indicate aversion to inequality, but we need also address the coefficient of 
mean income growth (hhdinc). For the whole electorate (model 1) we see weak evidence of 
indifference to inequality as the coefficient of hhdinc is insignificant and GrowthT10 is not. 
For low and middle-income voters, however, the evidence of inequality aversion is clear as 
mean income increases the probability of voting for the incumbent and income growth among 
wealthiest 90% has the opposite effect. For high-income voters the negative coefficients on 
both income variables indicate that these voters are indifferent to inequality. Summarizing 
Sweden, we see evidence of both indifference and aversion to inequality. 
When we add the stock indexes (table 5 – 7) we can see for France and Sweden that there is a 
clear tendency among all income groups (apart from low income voters in Sweden where the 
coefficient is insignificant) of voters being more likely to vote for the incumbent party or 
president during election years when the stock index has a positive performance (in accordance 
with predictions). This is shown by the positive and significant coefficients of the respective 
stock indexes. The same can be said of voters in the U.K (apart from low-income voters) but 
this effect is not statistically significant. A noticeable, statistically significant, change can be 
found among middle-income voters in Sweden who now display clear signs of indifference to 
inequality as the sign of hhdinc is now negative and significant at the 10% level (sign and 
significance of GrowthT5 stays the same). The positive and significant coefficient on omxs30 
could be interpreted as evidence of the stock index acting as a bias information source among 
middle-income voters. It suggests that voters are more likely to reward the incumbent party 
when the index is doing well rather than when mean income earners (their own economic 
group) see economic growth. This is solely based on the fact that the coefficient of hhdinc 
changed from positive to negative whilst remaining statistically significant. A similar effect 
can be seen among middle-income voters in France where the coefficient of cac40 is positive 
and significant whilst that of hhdinc is negative but insignificant. Other evidence that points to 
the possibility of stock indexes acting as a bias information source can be found for low-income 
voters in France and the U.K. In both countries we can see that the sign of the coefficient of 
top income growth is now negative but insignificant. If it was in fact the stock index that caused 
low-income voters to reward the incumbent for income growth at the top in the primary 
specification, this effect has now been accounted for when we add it as an explanatory variable. 
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The signs now show what previous theory suggests and predicts, that low income voters will 
punish the incumbent for unfair economic growth.  
I do interpret these results with caution, however. Firstly, the effect of middle-income voters 
identified in Sweden only finds similar results in France that are not statistically significant. 
No such evidence can be seen in the U.K. Secondly, the effect described among low-income 
voters in France and the U.K are both based on statistically insignificant results. These results 
are further based on observing coefficients of individual growth variables, if we are to draw 
any conclusions about CBEV we need to evaluate both coefficients of hhdinc and 
GrowthT5/T10.  
In this regard we can only see a clear change among the Swedish electorate where, after adding 
the stock index, omxs30, model 1,3 and 4 show that these voters are indifferent to inequality. 
Results for France remain the least robust after adding the stock index, cac40, and only has 
significant coefficients of hhdinc for model 1 and 4. Just as for the primary specification, this 
still indicates demand for inequality but is now weaker as the coefficients of GrowthT5 are 
insignificant. Results for U.K are the most robust as we only observe a statistically insignificant 
change in coefficients amongst low-income voters. After adding, ftse100, to the regression the 
U.K still displays indifference to inequality.       
Lastly, we analyse the result when we aggregate voters within each country after their 
educational level (tables 8-10). As we could see, the stock indexes for France and Sweden had 
positive signs across all education levels, where they were only insignificant for people with a 
master degree. Same was true for master and undergraduate voters in the U.K only with 
insignificant coefficients. This is in accordance with theory as we predicted that higher 
education would increase the probability of stock market participation. It therefore makes sense 
that more educated people would be more likely to vote for the incumbent when the stock 
market is doing well. So, what about the positive signs for people with, or less than, a primary 
education? Since these voters are less likely to hold stock the positive effect of the stock-index 
could yet again be a possible bias information source as they reward the incumbent after a 
variable which will likely not affect their economic gains.  Only in the U.K. do we see that less 
educated voters respond in a different way compared to more educated (although with 
statistically insignificant results). Looking at the ways different education levels respond to 
inequality; Swedish primary and undergraduate level voters show statistically significant 
indifference to inequality and master educated voters show weaker evidence of the same. For 
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the U.K, only the coefficient of GrowthT5 shows a significant (positive) sign so results are not 
very strong in terms of statistical significance. Judging only by the signs, model 1,3 and 4 show 
signs if indifference to inequality, whilst model 2 show that primary educated voters demand 
inequality. In France we see weak evidence of indifference to inequality among voters with 
less than a primary education and demand for inequality for undergraduate voters.      
To summarize the results of all three specifications, it is clear that the stock index has an impact 
on probability of voting for the incumbent party/ president in France and Sweden, not in the 
U.K. This holds true even after we aggregate individuals after education level rather than 
income. It is however difficult to draw any further conclusions of whether or not the stock 
index acts as a potential source for CBEV, even though we find that people who are less likely 
to hold stock do react positively to index performance. The reason for this is the lack of 
statistical significance in the coefficients the British stock index for voters in the U.K, and due 
to the mostly insignificant results of mean and top income growth in France.       
7. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to explore the possibility if CBEV is due to voters paying attention 
to macroeconomic variables which are correlated with economic fortunes of the wealthiest 
elites. The macroeconomic variable chosen was stock indexes since it is a frequently reported 
macroeconomic variable whose benefits are most likely to favour the wealthiest. The two 
questions to be answered were; 1. Does stock index performance during election year effect 
CBEV? 2. Does stock index performance increase the probability of voting for the incumbent 
party or president? This was done by looking at if people who are unlikely to hold stock have 
an increased probability of voting for the incumbent party or president during election year 
when the stock index is preforming well. Of equal importance, we looked at if people 
responded differently to mean and top income-growth after we included the stock index in the 
analysis. We could see that the stock index had a positive effect on probability of voting for 
incumbent party/ president in France and Sweden, but no significant effect in the U.K. Any 
evidence of the stock index effecting CBEV was difficult to prove given that the stock index 
had no significant effect in the U.K, and due to the mostly insignificant results of mean and top 
income growth in France. 
These results should, however, not discredit the theory of the stock market being a source for 
CBEV. The stock market is still an important macro-economic variable to analyse and its 
potential influence over vote choice deserves more attention in the literature. The two most 
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compelling arguments for this is the fact that active participation in the stock market is 
becoming more common who, in previous years, do not fit the profile of the regular investor 
Guiso et.al. (2003). The authors characterise the individuals as poorer and less sophisticated. 
Secondly, as Nadeau et.al. (2010) point out, people who are holders of high risk assets, such as 
stocks, place them at a point in society where they favour political parties to the right of the 
political spectrum. If these voters are less concerned about potential uneven distributional 
effect it further points to the importance of looking at if the stock market has any effect on vote 
choice. 
For future researchers I would like to point out that results perhaps would have turned out more 
conclusive if the data analysed were even more complete and covered a longer time span. For 
a model such as the one employed in this study that analyses individual vote choice, the results 
are dependent the quality of the survey that provides the individual level data. Although the 
ESS is a great database for those who want to look at European countries, the fact that it is only 
available in seven rounds (2002 – 2014) has limited the number of elections covered in each 
country. A more comprehensive approach, such as Bartels (2008) and Hicks et.al. (2016), 
would have meant individual data over a longer period and could have led to better, more 
significant results.    
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Appendix 1. 
Histograms: Income Decile 
Below are histograms for France, Sweden and the United Kingdom showing the density 
(frequency) of each income decile (self-reported after respondent). X-axis shows the decile and 
Y-axis density/ frequency.  
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United Kingdom 
Appendix 1.2 
Histograms: Education 
Below figures show the highest level of education for each country. Each country lists over 20 
different types of education. Respondents are coded after what corresponds to a primary level 
(high school degree), undergraduate degree, and a masters degree.  
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Appendix 1.3 
Histograms: Left – Right Scale 
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Appendix 1.4  
Control regressions using GrowthT10, France and U.K 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES voteinc voteinc voteinc voteinc 
France     
ltenure -0.177*** -0.0848 -0.185* -0.209*** 
 (0.0507) (0.101) (0.0983) (0.0771) 
idwinc 1.343*** 1.187*** 1.225*** 1.450*** 
 (0.0551) (0.137) (0.105) (0.0742) 
hhdinc -0.106*** -0.0157 -0.0696 -0.159*** 
 (0.0299) (0.117) (0.0548) (0.0409) 
GrowthT10 0.0182 -0.0275 0.00158 0.0378** 
 (0.0116) (0.0373) (0.0213) (0.0165) 
cac40 3.140*** 2.051* 2.928*** 3.653*** 
 (0.368) (1.126) (0.651) (0.559) 
lrscale 0.343*** 0.339*** 0.345*** 0.345*** 
 (0.0116) (0.0247) (0.0216) (0.0167) 
Constant -2.537*** -2.908*** -2.606*** -2.372*** 
 (0.136) (0.321) (0.255) (0.195) 
Pseudo R2 0.4498 0.4146 0.4243 0.4785 
Deciles All Low Middle High 
Observations 4,875 883 1,369 2,623 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES voteinc voteinc voteinc voteinc 
U.K     
ltenure -0.123*** -0.176*** -0.0206 -0.121*** 
 (0.0298) (0.0534) (0.0653) (0.0435) 
idwinc 1.112*** 0.778*** 1.208*** 1.188*** 
 (0.0347) (0.0766) (0.0671) (0.0487) 
hhdinc 0.0667* -0.0426 0.225*** 0.118** 
 (0.0389) (0.115) (0.0783) (0.0553) 
GrowthT10 0.0235*** -0.00430 0.0406*** 0.0352*** 
 (0.00739) (0.0311) (0.0145) (0.00952) 
ftse100 0.552 -5.018 5.099 2.926 
 (1.568) (5.462) (3.136) (2.138) 
lrscale -0.250*** -0.207*** -0.235*** -0.276*** 
 (0.00824) (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0119) 
Constant 0.807*** 1.326*** 0.0475 0.643*** 
 (0.160) (0.405) (0.332) (0.228) 
Pseudo R2 0.1893 0.1166 0.2147 0.2163 
Deciles All Low Middle High 
Observations 9,091 1,753 2,408 4,930 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
